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PPPs are held to be a powerful way of mobilising private finance and resources to deliver public infrastructure. 
Theoretically, research into procurement has begun to acknowledge difficulties with the classification and 
assessment of different types of procurement, particularly those which do not sufficiently acknowledge variety 
within specific types of procurement methods. This paper advances a theoretical framework based on an 
evolutionary economic conceptualisation of a routine, which can accommodate the variety evident in 
procurement projects, in particular PPPs. The paper tests how the various elements of a PPP, as advanced in the 
theoretical framework, affect performance across 10 case studies. It concludes, that a limited number of elements 
of a PPP affect their performance, and provides strong evidence for the theoretical model advanced in this paper.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) are a way of mobilising private finance and resources to deliver public infrastructure. 
According to [1] PPPs are “a contracting arrangement in which a private party, normally a consortium structured around a 
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), that takes responsibility for financing and long term maintenance or operation of a facility to 
provide long term service outcomes”. There is usually some level of joint decision making and sharing of risk [2]. A number of 
arguments have been put forward as to why governments may chose to deliver infrastructure using a PPP. These include: that 
the private sector can deliver infrastructure at lower cost than government, can reduce risk, uses private funds to pay for initial 
capital purchases, shifts large projects off balance sheets and budgets, and makes it easier to collect fees from users of the 
service. According to [3], growth in the use of PPPs “is due in a large part to the scope to bring in private sector management 
skills, the opportunity that bundling design, construction and operation, or parts thereof, provide to improve efficiency and the 
ability to bring forward the provision of the infrastructure service.” In summary PPPs “work best where government has 
considerable skill in contract negotiation and management, and where there is adequate competition for the projects. The costs 
of tendering, negotiating and managing contracts can be considerable – with tendering costs alone estimated at up to 3 per cent 
of the project cost. And while risks may be transferred to private partners, the cost of risk will be factored into the cost of 
finance. The main advantage of PPPs comes from the scope for lowering the total cost of the project through improving project 
risk management. And while contract negotiation can be lengthy, PPPs provide a more flexible, and potentially more timely 
source of finance for important infrastructure investments that might otherwise be constrained by public debt pressures” [3]. 
While some authors hold very positive views on the performance of PPPs [1], other authors point to significant differences in 
performance of PPPs [4], particularly as a result of the different types of risk and cost.  
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Theoretically, research into procurement in general has begun to acknowledge difficulties with classification of 
procurement routes, which do not sufficiently acknowledge the varieties which exist in specific approaches to procurement. 
According to [5] “The procurement routes selected for the project were virtually impossible to classify according to the 
commonly accepted labels … the contracts had been ‘heavily amended’ to a point that they no longer adhered to the type of 
structure that the industry would normally perceive to belong to any particular procurement route. Procurement is significantly 
more complex than construction academics would wish it to be – the variability is such, it is argued, that it is virtually 
impossible to classify procurement by any sort of rational positivistic approach”. This finding also holds for PPPs, as once the 
underlying characteristics of PPPs are taken into consideration, wide variations can be seen to exist when they are compared to 
each other [4]. Traditional approaches to procurement, which attempt to link different types of infrastructure procurement 
(such as PPPs or alliances) do not take into account the complexity and variation possible between projects, and this failure to 
take into account the all of the variables involved in projects results in considerable difficulties in assessing and comparing the 
performance of different projects.  
There is considerable variety within the procurement models relating to infrastructure, which has led to confusion, and a 
realisation that simple high level correlation techniques between PPP and success does not hold [4], particularly when success 
is viewed as more than on time and on budget. New analytical approaches need to be developed which can cope with the 
variability evident in procurement projects, and yet which can still provide some framework for analysing performance. This 
paper advances a new theoretical framework developed from organisational theory, evolutionary economics and complexity 
theory which can take into account the variety evident in procurement projects, in particular PPPs, and provide a framework 
for performance assessment. This theory is outlined in the section below.  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW   
In their seminal work, [6] highlight the importance of ‘routines’ as a unit of analysis in organisations, as they provide the 
basis of an evolutionary theory of organisations: “The first is the idea of organizational routine. At any time, organizations 
have built into them a set of ways of doing things and ways of determining what to do”. Routines are patterns of behaviour [6] 
which structure the specific ways organisations may do specific things. Empirical examples of routines include such aspects as 
budgeting and hiring of staff [7, 8]. As PPPs are recurrent patterns used by governments as a mechanism to procure 
infrastructure, this research holds that PPPs are a particular example of a routine which are implemented by government as a 
set way of achieving certain infrastructure projects. While early discussion of routines has focussed on viewing routines as 
undifferentiated singular entities, recent research has noted that there can be different elements in a routine, and it is helpful to 
discuss these elements in some detail. Identifying the various elements of a routine can assist in providing conceptual clarity 
about the nature of the routine, and [9] suggests that routines in organisations, can be viewed as being similar to genes in 
organisms. Thus routines are structured ways of undertaking specific activities and consist of various specific elements. It is 
this detailed view of routines, examining the various elements of PPPs, which goes beyond traditional approaches to analysing 
the performance of PPPs.  
Despite early theorists [6] arguing from an evolutionary perspective of economics that routines are the analogue of genes in 
organisations, attempts to specify how routines can be seen to be similar to genes are still very few [9 p.662]. While well 
established in the routine literature, there is little in the organisational or economic literature to assist in explicating and 
examining the genes of routines. To understand routines as genes, by way of analogy, it is necessary to turn to biological 
theorists – particularly those who can theoretically inform the organisational theory of routines and how the genes of routines 
affect performance of the routines.  
One theorist who has provided a cogent explanation of complex adaptive systems and relates this to performance of 
organisms is Kauffman [10, 11]. The work of Kauffman [10, 11] has not been engaged with significantly in the routines 
literature to date (although some mention his work in passing [see 12]). However, the wider organisational theory literature has 
begun to engage with Kauffman’s work [13] as it provides a pragmatic approach to using biological metaphors which can be 
readily applied to the problems of business and government. Such application has focussed on search and stability in 
organisations [14], and designing organisations in order to respond to changes in their landscapes or business environment [15, 
16]. 
Kauffman [11], focuses on biological entities in his work, which examines how genes affect the fitness of an organism in a 
given landscape. Kauffman’s [11] approach can readily be understood as for animals, certain traits (derived from their genes) 
result in improved performance on particular landscapes. For example, thick fur or blubber helps animals to survive in the cold 
climates like the Antarctic, whereas long legs and short hair are better on savannahs. The sum of the genes of animals 
contributes to their fitness – or performance – on various landscapes [17]. Fitness is the essential element of adaptation [18], 
and is therefore an essential element of adaptive systems. The most appropriate rules, (i.e. the ones that ‘work’) are the ones 
that tend to be reinforced – as they have a high level of fitness for organisms in relation to the ‘landscape’. 
Each gene has several alternative forms called alleles … and these forms usually have distinct observable affects 
on the organism. The objective in genetics, as it is for rules, is to determine the effects of different alternatives at 
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different positions. In mathematical genetics there is a classical approach to determining these effects. It is to assume 
that each allele contributes something positive or negative to the overall fitness of the organism [17]  
Both [11] and [17] argue that the fitness of a particular animal on a given landscape can be determined by identifying the 
genes of the animal, and assessing how these contribute to the overall performance of the animal on a given landscape. In a 
similar fashion, [19] has argued that routines can be conceptualised as genes sequences of DNA. As [6, 106] argue 
organizations respond routinely with a wide variety of specialised routine performances, each ‘customised’ for a particular 
configuration of the environment. In other words, there is not a single routine, but rather a number of different ways in which 
the routine can be performed, and the effectiveness of the routine needs to match the environment in which it is situated. Thus 
routines have been conceptualised as similar to DNA sequences in the routines literature. In both biological literature and 
routines literature, there is an understanding that there are various elements of a routine (or gene), which contribute in various 
ways to performance.   
This suggests the following research question: Research Question 1 – How can PPPs be conceptualised as a gene?    
2.1 Conceptualisation of PPPs as routines 
In the previous section a theoretical proposition was put forward, that PPPs, as routine procurement arrangements, contain 
various elements or options which could be conceptualised as analogous to the gene of an organism, and the structure of these 
elements can be related to performance. While this has been advocated theoretically, operationalisation of the concept in 
specific situation remains to be achieved. This section outlines how a PPP project might be reconceptualised as something 
similar to a gene. It should be noted that this is a metaphorical approach and there is not intent to argue that a PPP is literally 
and actually a gene.  
In order to determine the various elements of the routine, firstly the various elements or sections of the PPP ‘entity’ need to 
be determined. [20], [21] [22]and [4] have already identified several key elements of any type of procurement project which 
will be used to analyse PPPs which is based on economic theory. These elements of PPPs are set out in Table 1 below, together 
with the various options available in each ‘gene’, and an explanation of each element follows. Importantly, this approach 
which does not rely on the traditional labelling system which has been soundly criticised [23] as it does not allow for the sheer 
level of variation evident in PPP projects.  
Table 1 
Genetic elements of a PPP routine  
Asset 
specificity 
Construction 
Cost 
Cost risk 
transferred  
Construction 
complexity 
Contestability Revenue 
uncertainty 
Revenue 
risk 
transferred 
Govt 
contract 
management 
skills 
Externalities 
or other 
negative 
events 
Transaction 
costs 
High or 
Low 
Actual $ 
cost 
Yes or No High, 
medium, low 
High, 
medium, low 
High, 
medium or 
low 
Yes or no Poor, fair, 
good 
Actual 
events 
High, 
moderate, 
or low 
 
Each of these elements are discussed below 
2.1.1 Asset specificity: Asset specificity can relate to variety of uses of an asset, or how specific the asset is to a 
particular location [20]. Specificity can be physical, locational, and/or temporal [22]. Dams exhibit high 
location specificity and can only be used for a single purpose in a single location, making them effectively a 
one of a kind asset with very high specificity. Manufactured goods, such as cars are not location specific, 
although cars are built for different purposes. Assets which can be used for multiple purposes, or are not 
location specific, have low asset specificity. The specificity of an asset can significantly impact its 
performance so is a key element, or gene, of PPPs. An asset may have high or low specificity.  
2.1.2 Construction Cost: Cost is the simple value of the PPP contract and is a key performance element of PPPs.  
2.1.3 Cost risk transferred: With any major project, there are risks that costs could increase beyond the contract 
price. Under some PPP arrangements costs can be transferred from government to the private sector as part 
of the contract [4]. Shifting of cost risk may significantly affect the performance of a PPP so is likely to be a 
key driver of performance. Cost risk is either transferred in the PPP arrangement or not.  
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2.1.4 Complexity: Task Complexity refers to the degree of difficulty in specifying the terms, conditions and 
outcomes of the procurement activity [21]. “Complex goods involve uncertainty the nature and costs of the 
production process itself. They also face more environmental uncertainty because complex goods are more 
likely to be affected by unforseen changes in the environment” [21]. Complexity increases the potential 
costs, due to knowledge asymmetry and opportunism, as well as potential externalities [22]. Complexity is 
therefore a key element which can affect the performance of PPPs. Projects can evidence high, medium, or 
low complexity.  
2.1.5 Contestability (competition): The higher the competition involved in tendering for specific goods, the 
lower the prices, as competition tends to drive prices down [22].  
2.1.6 Revenue uncertainty: For some PPPs there is a level of uncertainty about how much revenue a particular 
asset will generate. As PPPs require investment by the private sector in public infrastructure, the revenue, or 
return, from such investment is an important element of the performance of the PPP [4]. Consequently it is a 
very important element which might affect the performance of PPPs. PPPs can have high, medium or low 
revenue uncertainty.  
2.1.7 Revenue risk transferred: While revenue is a key risk, in some cases government underwrites or guarantees 
the income for a period of time, whereas in other cases the risk is transferred to the private sector [4]. 
Consequently, the transfer of revenue risk is an important element which can affect the performance of PPPs, 
as in situations of high revenue uncertainty the private sector may not be willing to accept the full risk for the 
project, leaving government with ongoing financial obligations for the project. Revenue risk is either 
transferred or not in PPPs.  
2.1.8 Government contract management skills: PPPs are quite complex organisational and contractual 
arrangements, so the skills of the government agency in handling these contracts is critical to the successful 
negotiation, and completion of the project [4]. Government skill levels can be high, might be poor, fair or 
good.   
2.1.9 Externalities or other negative events: Occasionally irrespective of the financial performance of a project, 
considerable negative external events can be generated, such as poor service levels, obstruction of other 
projects or interference with other infrastructure [23] These can affect an otherwise successful project and 
lead to a perception that the project is poor, even if it is delivered on time and on budget. Externalities need 
to be noted on a case by case basis, as they are idiosyncratic to the specific project.  
2.1.10 Transaction costs: While a project has direct costs, a key logic in economic literature, which is often 
understated in the contracting out literature, is that the total cost of the project involves not just the costs in 
delivering the project, but also in managing the contractual arrangements [24]. While a project may be 
delivered within budget, high costs in managing the contract may result in the project being too expensive 
overall, particularly if legal action is involved. Analysis of costs in public projects tends has tended to not 
include these costs in the costs of a project [22]. Consequently, transaction costs are a critical element which 
may affect the performance of the project. Transaction costs can either be high, medium or low.  
Kauffman [10, 11] suggests that the various elements of the routine can be related positively or negatively to performance. 
As has been noted above, each of the elements of the routine has the potential at least to affect the outcome of a particular PPP. 
Taken together, these elements of a PPP include critical aspects which can affect project performance, and allow for the 
detailed analysis of the elements, and how each of these might affect performance, and suggest a second research question:  
Research Question 2: How do the elements of a PPP routine affect performance?  
Finally, as alluded to in the introduction, other researchers have found that there is considerable variety in  procurement 
approaches [5]. By viewing procurement approaches, such as PPPs as a routine, it is proposed that the variability in 
procurement approaches can be explored. This suggests the final research question: 
Research Question 3: How variable are PPPs as routines?  
The elements of PPPs and how these elements affect performance are analysed in the results section below. Firstly a brief 
discussion of research methods is appropriate.  
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3 RESEARCH METHODS    
One useful way of undertaking in-depth analysis of a particular issue or technology as it impacts an organisation or 
industry, is by undertaking case studies, as such a strategy can provide strong recommendations for improvements in theory, 
technology or policy [25, 26]. As noted there is a dearth of existing work undertaken the area of routines [9, 27]. In such cases, 
exploratory research using case study methodology is seen to be appropriate [28]. This is because a series of case studies can 
develop the application of theory to an area [29], and test the applicability of that theory for utility in explaining specific 
phenomena.  In particular, undertaking multiple case studies on the same phenomena, allows for comparison between the 
cases, and extension of theory. 
In multiple cases a logic of replication is followed in order to compare data and improve the generalisability of the data  
[30].  Multiple case studies enable researchers to clarify whether a finding is peculiar to a singular case study, or whether it is 
consistently replicated across several cases [31]. Multiple case studies provide a much stronger case for generalisability than 
single case studies [31].  This is because examining a phenomenon in multiple situations leads to better understanding, and 
perhaps better theorising, about an even wider selection of cases [32]. By examining the elements of multiple PPPs and 
comparing these with the perceived performance of the PPPs, underlying contribution of specific elements of the routine to 
performance becomes clear. The analysis of multiple PPPs enables both the individual elements and how these elements 
contribute to performance to become clear.  
Existing research has already been undertaken into the performance of a number of PPPs in Canada [2, 4]. This paper will 
draw heavily on [2, 4] to analyse these 10 PPPs as a separate case each, as the data provides useful framework for assessing 
performance of PPPs in the routines framework advanced in this paper.  
Case studies are best suited to real life phenomena under conditions where researchers have little control [33], and are 
appropriate for examining events or activities [34]. As this paper is examining how routines can be conceptualised as a gene, 
then a case study methodology is appropriate as an overarching strategy. In particular the use of multiple case studies enables 
the comparison of different arrangements in order to determine the underlying contribution of specific elements to 
performance. The findings of the study are reported below.  
4 FINDINGS  
In attempting to develop a new theoretical framework this paper has uses existing reports of the performance of PPPs, as 
the focus is on testing the validity of the theoretical framework, not examining a new situation per se.  
Data has been made available on the performance of PPPs against the elements identified above [4]. In fact the 
performance of 10 PPPs provides 10 case studies to test the validity of Research Question 1 – how can a routine be 
conceptualised as a gene. It also provides a useful set of comparative studies in which to answer Research Question 2: How 
does the structure of the routine affect performance?  
While data is drawn from existing work, the theoretical framework used to assess the performance and the structure of the 
PPP as a gene is new. Consequently, these findings serve to extend and critique the existing work of [4].  
4.1 Structure of Canadian PPP 
In the theory section, we advanced a proposition that as routines PPPs could be considered metaphorically to be like a gene, 
and a number of different project genes, or elements, were identified from the existing literature. 10 case studies were reviewed 
and each of these elements was identified for each case study.  
As can be seen from Table 2, PPPs exist in a wide variety of configurations. Once viewed from the perspective of routines, 
there is no single form of PPP but rather a wide variety of projects and structures which happen to all bear the same name. 
Given the high variability between each of the PPPs reviewed,  this finding supports the concerns of [23] who argued that the 
sheer variability of procurement projects makes treating each one the same thing highly difficult. Instead, examining the 
various elements of each PPP allows for the differences and similarities between each of them to become apparent, and as will 
be discussed in the next section, the elements which affect performance to become clear. Those elements which do not relate 
clearly to performance (e.g. complexity, specificity, and cost) are not shown in the table. Contestability is a separate issue and 
will be referred to separately.  
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Table 2: Structure and performance of 10 Canadian PPPs (derived and adapted from [2, 4]) 
Pr
o
jec
t 
Type Start 
Date  
Cost risk 
transferred  
Revenue 
uncertainty 
Revenue 
risk 
transferred 
Government 
contract 
management 
skills 
Negative 
Externalities  
Contract 
transaction 
costs 
Success 
1 Waste 
management 
1987 Partially Moderate Not first 
ten years 
Poor Chemical 
leaks, under 
utilisation. 
High No 
2 Sports 
Multiplex 
1999 Not 
effectively 
Moderate Partially Fair-Poor None evident. High No 
3 Highway 1999 Yes High No Poor 6 toll increases 
- roads 
congested 
High No 
4 School  1997 Yes, but 
costs high 
Low No Poor Negative 
political 
outcomes 
High No 
5 Highway  1995 Yes High-
Moderate 
No Fair Toll-level 
problems 
Moderate No 
(qualified ) 
6 Bridge  1997 Yes High Revenue 
guarantees 
Fair None evident Moderate  Yes 
(qualified) 
7 School 1995 Yes Low Yes Fair None evident Moderate Yes 
8 Gas power  1998 Yes Low Yes Good None evident Average Yes 
9 Water 
treatment 
2005 Yes Moderate Yes Good None evident Low Yes 
10 Water 
treatment 
2005 Yes Low Partially Good None evident Low Yes 
 
Thus in response to Research Question 1 – by viewing PPPs as a set of elements, PPPs can be viewed in a similar way to a 
gene. Each PPP can be viewed as comprising a set of characteristics, or variables which in turn might relate to performance. 
This issue of performance is a critical aspect of the use of the metaphor of routines as genes and is discussed in the next 
section. Additionally, viewing PPPs as routines demonstrates the sheer variability of routines. Thus in answer to Research 
Question 3, there is a very wide variety of procurement routines.  
4.2 The performance of PPP genetic structure   
As outlined in section 4.1, the analysis of 10 PPPs according to their elements allows for a finer grained analysis than 
simply examining cost or quality which is often used to asses the outcome of projects. As suggested by Kauffman [10], by 
adopting a more fine-grained approach the performance of each of the PPPs, and how these might relate to different 
arrangements also becomes clear. As Table 2 suggests, projects 1 to 5 were considered not to be as success, while projects 6 to 
10 were considered to be successes. Looking across the various elements, the relative strength of each of these in relation to 
successful and unsuccessful projects can be ascertained, and these are discussed below.  
Kauffman [10] argued that for certain animals, certain genetic structures resulted in poor performance (e.g. polar bears in 
the desert). However, other genetic structures enabled animals to perform well (e.g. cheetahs in the savannahs of Africa). Each 
of the various elements and how these affect performance are discussed below.  
4.2.1 Asset specificity: All the assets reviewed had high levels of asset specificity [4]– particularly location 
specificity, so this in effect formed a constant and has been removed from further analysis in this paper on 
the contribution of specific elements to performance.  
4.2.2 Construction Complexity: All the projects were from low to medium complexity and there was no 
correlation between low or medium complexity and the outcome of a specific project [4]. Consequently, 
while an important element in projects, this variable does not relate to performance in the PPPs examined. 
There was a weak relationship between complexity and cost, as the more complex projects tended to be 
higher cost, but this did not directly relate to performance overall.  
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4.2.3 Contestability: Contestability is a key issue in the assessment of the performance of a PPP as the use of the 
private sector assumes that competition will keep cost down [2, 35]. It is surprising that [2, 4] do not report 
on the contestability issue. It is possible that it was not possible to report on this aspect of the theoretical 
framework. For many government contracts through, the number of bids received is recorded and can 
provide a useful measure of the extent of competition involved in the bidding for various projects.  
4.2.4 Construction Cost: While the cost varied significantly, there was no direct correlation between cost and 
performance. Indirectly however, the greater the value of the project, the more difficult it appeared to shift 
cost risk to the private sector [4]. Less complex projects tend to be less costly, and therefore less risky for the 
private sector to take on.  However, there is some dynamic interaction between variables here, so further 
research is needed to unpack the relationships between complexity, cost and transferral of cost risks. 
Whereas some evaluations see cost as one of the key performance measures of PPPs [1] (dependent 
variables), in this framework there are multiple costs that are variables which influence the outcomes 
(independent variables).  
4.2.5 Cost risk transferred: Every project which was successful, the cost risk was transferred to private sector. 
The results are more mixed for unsuccessful projects – only two PPPs successfully transferred cost risk, and 
another one did so with high costs associated with the transfer [4]. From a government perspective the logic 
of involving the private sector in a PPP involves financing a project, which means logically that there needs 
to be a shift of costs to the private firms.  
4.2.6 Revenue uncertainty and revenue risk transferred: Under the framework adopted in this paper, different 
types of risk are acknowledged. While cost risk involves the possibility of the construction costs increasing 
beyond budget, revenue risk relates to the operational life of the PPP. Revenue uncertainty is fairly complex, 
and does not seem to operate on its own. Instead, as [4] argues, as revenue uncertainty increased, the 
likelihood of revenue risk being transferred, decreased. In other words, the more uncertain the operational 
profit was for the private partner, the less likelihood that the private partner would accept this type of risk, 
although this was not a clear cut relationship.  While cost risk may be off set by expertise in the private 
sector which can generate better estimates of cost than government [4]. Revenue risk is far more difficult for 
the private sector to ameliorate as it is beyond their power to increase the revenue generated by infrastructure 
assets. In case 6, the project was a success, even with otherwise negative elements, due to reasonable 
management skills and a limited revenue guarantee [4].  
Some critical public policy guidelines assert that revenue risk can be transferred to the private sector under PPPs, 
[36], while some economists [4] and financial advisers [37] argue that this risk should not be transferred.  This paper 
takes more nuanced approach, by acknowledging both risk and uncertainty. The more certain a private partner can be 
about the return on investment in the operational cycle, the more likely a project is to succeed. This differentiation 
between cost risk (in the construction phase) and revenue risk (in the operation phase of a PPP) is a useful distinction 
which warrants further exploration, and one which has begun to appear in detailed public policy documentation [38]. 
However, the assumption that revenue risk can automatically be transferred in PPPs evident in some public policy 
advice [36] is not supported with evidence found by [4] and reported here.   
4.2.7 Government contract management skills: [4] does mention government contract management skills, 
although this is not given the same high level of focus in their paper as risk is given. And yet, the relationship 
between government contracting skills and successful completion of projects is arguably as strong, or even 
stronger, once interpreted and reordered as per Table 2, than that of risk. Such a finding also supports other 
work by the authors which found that the capability of clients to affect procurement is a critical driver of 
successful procurement arrangements [39].  
4.2.8 Externalities or other negative events: Externalities were identified from the economic literature as a likely 
element of PPPs which could affect performance. As can be seen from table 2, in nearly every case the 
negative externalities is highly related to poor performance of the PPP (80% of cases)[4].  
4.2.9 Transaction costs: As Table 2 demonstrates, high and moderate transaction costs (the costs involved with 
managing the contract) were also related to the poor performance of the PPP.  However, moderate 
transaction costs, combined with low revenue uncertainty seemed to result in reasonable project performance 
[4].   
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Summary of performance: These finding answers the second research question as to how the elements of PPP routines affect 
performance. As Kauffman [10] argues that the genes of an animal can determine its performance on a specific landscape. 
What would the metaphorical genes of a successful PPP be? According to the studies examined in this paper, a successful PPP 
is one with the following elements set out in Table 3:  
Table 3 
Genes of successful PPPs  
Cost risk 
transferred  
Revenue 
uncertainty 
Revenue risk 
transferred 
Government contract 
management skills 
Negative 
Externalities  
Contract 
transaction costs 
Yes Low - moderate Yes Fair to Good None  Moderate to Low 
 
In the same way, the genes of unsuccessful PPPs can be identified from the literature [2, 4, 20-22, 35].  
Table 4 
Genes of unsuccessful PPPs  
Asset 
specificity 
Complexity Cost risk 
transferred  
Revenue 
uncertainty 
Revenue risk 
transferred 
Government 
contract 
management 
skills 
Negative 
Externalities  
Contract 
transaction 
costs 
High High No High  No  Low Present  High 
 
A PPP likely to succeed is one where cost risk is transferred to the private sector, but one where there is low revenue 
uncertainty, medium to high contract management skills, low transaction costs and absence of negative externalities [4]. Indeed 
this finding begs the question about the utility of PPPs as a procurement vehicle: “Our analysis suggests that, in some sense, 
effective PPPs are not PPPs! Private sector project participation makes the most sense when it bears cost risks, but not revenue 
risks. In such circumstances, there is not that much different from what has been traditionally described as a ‘build-operate-
transfer’ contract” [4].  
This finding also relates to Research Question 3, which examines the variability of PPP routines. Viewed from the 
perspective advanced in this paper, while all of these projects were labelled PPPs, not all of them performed well, or contained 
the key aspects (financial risk transfer) which are a key component of PPPs. Consequently, while there are multiple varieties of 
PPPs, only some varieties can be considered successes.  
5 LIMITATIONS  
The analysis undertaken in this paper is based on existing research and amounts to a re-examination and an extension of 
previous studies. One of the issues with the existing assessment of performance is that it appears to be largely subjective. For 
example “negative externalities and high transaction costs lead us to conclude that this project was poor from a social 
perspective” [4]. The social cost of PPPs is argued by the sane authors to  be the correct one for assessing the performance of 
PPPs [22]. Thus the poor performance is a subjective assessment not based on objective measures, but on the basis of 
theoretically driven criteria. In fact, performance is a highly difficult area in projects, as there are multiple criteria for claiming 
success and otherwise successful projects can be deemed unsuccessful by other authors or stakeholders. Nevertheless, other 
authors focus on financial performance of PPPs [1], which is certainly one valid measure. By extending the assessment of 
performance to include the social issues associated with PPPs [4] a wider array of actors becomes involved. As PPPs are often 
created to deliver public services such as waste management, water and electricity, it is important that the social impact of 
various PPPs is considered, as a project which is a financial success may well not be delivering the services it was meant to 
provide in the first place. Future research would need to consider other performance criteria of PPPs in order to explore the 
issue of performance more closely.  
A second limitation is that in the reported outcomes of 10 PPPs [4], the conditions of the market are not taken into 
consideration. Other frameworks consider the issue of the contestability of the market in assessing performance [20, 21], as 
this can seriously affect the performance of procurement arrangements. Indeed with the low contestability the logic 
underpinning contracting out in the first place, as competition drives cost down, making procurement from the private sector 
viable in the first instance [20]. Future research should also consider the impact of the market forces on projects which is not 
currently included in this model.  
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6 CONCLUSIONS  
This paper set out to test the validity of a new theoretical framework for PPPs, using existing PPP research. In so doing, a 
set of findings enabled both research questions to be answered. Firstly, it is suggested that it is possible to examine the 
structure of procurement projects such as PPPs by identifying the various elements of the routine’s ‘gene’. Indeed such a 
process underscores the importance of undertaking such analysis at a detailed level as there is a high level of individual 
variation between projects.  
A second outcome was that the re-analysis of the existing data enables a clear and concise picture of the influence of 
specific genes on the performance of PPPs. This finding supports the second research question which sought to identify if 
specific ‘genes’ can be shown to relate to the performance of PPP routines. It is evident that there are a number of elements 
which affect performance, and a few which do not – at least in the case studies reviewed here.  
This study has demonstrated that viewing PPPs through the metaphor of genes enables the variation between the various 
elements of PPPs to become apparent, and to assess how these elements relate to performance. While a larger number of 
projects would test and generalise these findings to all projects, strong support for the theoretical validity of the framework 
advanced earlier in this paper has been demonstrated.  
Consequently, the model advanced in this paper offers a novel theoretical framework which holds promise for providing a 
robust and accurate framework to asses the elements and performance of procurement arrangements such as PPPs. Aside from 
the theoretical value of such a framework, there is considerable practical utility to enable government and firms to assess under 
what circumstances to use PPP as a procurement method.  
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